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Abstract
In this paper, we expose an unorthodox adversarial attack that
exploits the transients of a system’s adaptive behavior, as op-
posed to its limited steady-state capacity. We show that a well
orchestrated attack could introduce significant inefficiencies
that could potentially deprive a network element from much
of its capacity, or significantly reduce its service quality,
while evading detection by consuming an unsuspicious, small
fraction of that element’s hijacked capacity. This type of at-
tack stands in sharp contrast to traditional brute-force, sus-
tained high-rate DoS attacks, as well as recently proposed
attacks that exploit specific protocol settings such as TCP
timeouts. We exemplify what we term as Reduction of Qual-
ity (RoQ) attacks by exposing the vulnerabilities of common
adaptation mechanisms. We develop control-theoretic mod-
els and associated metrics to quantify these vulnerabilities.
We present numerical and simulation results, which we val-
idate with observations from real Internet experiments. Our
findings motivate the need for the development of adaptation
mechanisms that are resilient to these new forms of attacks.
1. Introduction
Motivation and Scope: Over the past few years, Denial
of Service (DoS) attacks have emerged as a serious vul-
nerability for almost every Internet service. An adversary
bent on limiting access to a network resource could sim-
ply marshal enough client machines to bring down an In-
ternet service by subjecting it to sustained levels of de-
mand that far exceed its capacity, making that service inca-
pable of adequately responding to legitimate requests. In the
most recent of these attacks, MyDoom earned its malevolent
moniker by crashing SCO Group’s Web site as the email-
carried W32/Novarg.A, W32/Shimg, and W32/Mydoom
worms mounted a widespread and record-setting Distributed
DoS (DDoS) attack in the first minutes of February 1st.
While such attacks may be viewed by some as mere
nuisances, the impact of these attacks on critical resources
and services may cripple our increasingly Internet-dependent
economy. Already, the MyDoom attack is estimated to have
cost the global economy over $26.1B [34]. Luckily, DoS at-
tacks that overwhelm a service beyond its capacity are not
easy to mount because they do require control of a fairly large
base [33], e.g., 100K-200K zombie clients in the case of My-
Doom. More importantly, by their very nature, DoS attacks
are easily discovered, making it possible for counter mea-
sures to be taken, including the collection of information that
could be used to prosecute the attack perpetrators. 1
The ability to anticipate a DoS attack and/or to trace-
back perpetrators thereof are powerful deterrents. But, what
if victims of an attack cannot anticipate or even detect that
they are under an attack? What if the attack’s purpose is not
to necessarily cripple a service, but rather to inflict significant
degradation in some aspect of the service—e.g., resource uti-
lization, system stability, or service quality?
In this paper, we expose an attack that exploits sys-
tem dynamics—i.e., the characteristics of a system’s transient
behavior as opposed to its limited steady-state capacity—to
achieve the above adversarial goals. In particular, we show
that a determined adversary could bleed a system’s capacity
or significantly reduce service quality by subjecting the sys-
tem to a fairly low-intensity (but well orchestrated and timed)
request stream that causes the system to become very ineffi-
cient, or unstable. We give examples of such attacks—which
we term Reduction of Quality (RoQ; as in “rock”) attacks—
on a number of common adaptive components in modern
computing and networking systems. RoQ attacks stand in
sharp contrast to traditional brute-force, sustained high-rate
DoS attacks [5], as well as recently proposed “shrew” attacks
[22] that exploit specific protocol settings such as TCP time-
outs. Indeed, as the results in this paper show, RoQ attacks
are potentially more potent than both DoS and shrew attacks.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
+ We formalize a notion of attack “potency”, which exposes
the tradeoff between the “damage” inflicted by an attacker
(e.g., waste in bandwidth) and the “cost” of the attack (e.g.,
average attack rate).
1As of the writing of this paper, SCO and Microsoft were each offering
$2.5M rewards for informants of MyDoom’s originators.
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+ We parameterize our definition of potency to capture the
aggressiveness of the attacker (i.e., the level of exposure
risk that the attacker is willing to take). We then introduce
families of DoS attacks based on aggressiveness.
+ We focus on less aggressive DoS attacks that exploit the
transients of the system’s underlying adaptation mecha-
nisms. We term these “RoQ attacks,” and we identify dif-
ferent attack goals based on the service quality targeted by
the attacker for degradation.
+ Unlike existing DoS attacks which target a specific host
or a set of flows, we are able to define RoQ attacks which
can continually degrade a network element’s performance
(and thus all flows passing through it). We introduce RoQ
attacks which target various service qualities such as rate
and delay jitter.
+ We crystallize the effect of RoQ attacks by analytically
deriving effect of attack traffic on the network element’s
efficiency-load curve. For instance, an attacker can contin-
ually disturb the stability of a router by affecting the con-
gestion signals (prices) fed back to rate-adaptive sources.
+ In addition to analytical, numerical, and simulation re-
sults, we present real Internet experiments that confirm the
premise of RoQ attacks. For example, we show that a RoQ
attack can achieve higher potency than a “shrew” attack
[22] whose attack period is chosen so as to target a spe-
cific initial TCP timeout value. The shrew attack showed
a potency of only 4.3, where as the potency of the RoQ
attack was over 12.25 (close to three times that achieved
by the shrew attack). The lower potency (i.e. damage per
unit-cost) of shrew-type attacks is due to its exploitation
of the specific timeout behavior of TCP, which can only
be induced at a much higher cost (attack traffic).
Paper Outline: We start this paper in Section 2 by intro-
ducing the premise and definition of RoQ attacks. Also, we
propose a general metric for the quantification of the impact
of RoQ attacks. In Section 3, we present an illustrative an-
alytical model whereby the transients of adaptation are sim-
ply the result of an optimization process which forces a net-
work to converge to a stable operating point. In Section 4,
we present experimental results obtained numerically using a
more detailed control-theoretic model in which the dynamics
of queue management (e.g., RED) as well as TCP’s AIMD
adaptation are explicitly modeled. These numerical results
are validated in Section 5 using extensive ns simulations in
which other phenomena that are not captured in our analyti-
cal models are present (e.g., TCP slow-start and timeouts). In
Section 6, we present results from Internet experiments we
have conducted, which confirm the feasibility of RoQ attacks
and provide further validation of the insights we gained from
analysis and simulations. In Section 7, we discuss how RoQ
attacks could target end systems. In Section 8, we briefly
discuss related work, noting that throughout this paper, we
point to various pieces of research work as appropriate. We
conclude in Section 9 with a summary and future directions.
2. RoQ Attack Premise and Definition
Network Adaptation Mechanisms and Vulnerabilities:
End system protocols (e.g., TCP) rely on feedback mech-
anisms to adapt their sending rates to match their “fair
share” of network resources. TCP reduces its sending rate
on packet loss/marking and increases its rate on success-
ful packet transmission. Typically, the decrease in rate,
which is needed to protect against wasting network utiliza-
tion, is drastic—e.g., by halving the sending rate—whereas
the increase in rate, which is needed to probe for available
bandwidth, is slow—e.g., by linearly increasing the sending
rate over time. Additive-Increase-Multiplicative-Decrease
(AIMD) rules2 ensure that flows react adequately to conges-
tion in a “friendly” manner to one another—hence the TCP-
friendly label [15]. Moreover, these protocols react even
more swiftly to excessive losses by completely shutting off
their sending rates for a long period of time (e.g., timing out
in TCP).
Buffer management schemes play an important role in
the effectiveness of transmission control mechanisms as they
constitute the feedback signal (by marking or dropping pack-
ets) to which such mechanisms adapt. In DropTail, an in-
coming packet to a full queue is dropped otherwise, its is
queued. DropTail doesn’t try to achieve any performance im-
provements, nor does it try to stabilize the queue size. Other
Active Queue Management (AQM) techniques have been de-
veloped that try to maintain the queue size at a target level
and employ probabilistic dropping—e.g., RED and its many
variants [13, 23, 30], PI [17] and REM [1]). Such techniques
improve fairness and allow flows to send small bursts of pack-
ets without experiencing packet drops. Stabilizing the queue
at a low target guarantees efficiency while minimizing jitter
and round trip time in general.
The adaptation strategies of transmission control proto-
cols such as TCP, while crucial for alleviating congestion,
make them vulnerable to losses that are generated through
other processes—namely losses that are not the result of con-
gestion (e.g., wireless losses). The impact of such losses on
TCP performance was considered in many studies; examples
include [2]. In these studies, however, the processes inter-
fering with TCP’s adaptation could be considered “non ad-
versarial” in the sense that the losses were more or less the
result of (say) a random process as opposed to a calculated
attack. Indeed, in recent work, it was shown that an attacker
could potentially shut off the communication between two
parties (e.g., Alice and Bob) by mounting what is termed as a
“shrew” attack [22]—an attack that exploits TCP’s time-out
mechanism, which is how TCP adapts to persistent conges-
tion. In the following sections of this paper, we show that the
vulnerabilities resulting from the dynamics of adaptation are
2Other TCP-friendly increase/decrease rules have also been proposed and
evaluated [3]. All would be susceptible with various degrees to the same
issues we consider in this paper.
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potentially more serious than shrew attacks in that an attacker
could in effect target a potentially large set of connections uti-
lizing a single resource (or set of resources as we will argue
later) such as a network link.
Attack Definition: The feedback signal from a given link
carries important information to senders about how they
should adjust their sending rates. Carrying false signals
would cause the senders to back off at times of non-persistent
congestion, or to increase when congestion in fact exists! For
the purposes of this paper, we focus on attack techniques
that would hinder an AQM from stabilizing its queue, and
hence resulting in a noisy feedback signal to the end-system
transmission controllers, which in turn would lead to high jit-
ters due to oscillations, as well as inefficiencies due to queue
drainage, i.e, the input rate can’t saturate the link capacity.
Consider a bottleneck link of capacity C and a buffer
size B shared by m TCP connections and a single CBR con-
nection, representing the attack traffic. For simplicity, we
consider an attack comprising a burst of M packets (or bytes)
transmitted at the rate of δ packets (or bytes) per second over
a short period of time τ , where M = δτ . This process is
repeated every T units of time. We call M the magnitude of
the attack, δ the amplitude of the attack, τ the duration of the
attack, and T the period of the attack.
Attack Goal: For the above attack, we define Π, the attack
potency, to be the ratio between the damage caused by that
attack and the cost of mounting such an attack. Clearly, an
attacker would be interested in maximizing the damage per
unit cost—i.e., maximizing the attack potency.
Potency = Π =
Damage
Cost
1
Ω
(1)
The above definition does not specify what constitutes “dam-
age” and “cost”. In the remainder of this paper, we will con-
sider various instantiations of these metrics. For example, for
an attacker aiming to minimize the utilization of a link, a nat-
ural metric of “damage” would be the difference between the
total bandwidth through the link before and after the attack
(excluding the attacker’s traffic). If the attacker aims to max-
imize a link’s jitter, then a natural metric of “damage” would
be the difference between the standard deviation of the queue
size before and after the attack. Similarly, there could be a
number of different metrics for what constitutes “cost”. Ex-
amples include the effective attack bit-rate (i.e., M/T ), the
attack amplitude δ, the attack duration τ , etc.
The above definition uses a parameter Ω to model the
aggressiveness of the attacker. A large Ω reflects the highest
level of aggression, i.e., an attacker bent on inflicting the most
damage and for whom cost is not a concern. Mounting a DoS
attack is an example of such behavior. A small Ω reflects
an attacker whose goal is to maximize damage with minimal
exposure. Unless specified otherwise, for the remainder of
this paper we take Ω to be 1.
Detection and Traceback of RoQ Attacks: As we have
hinted in the introduction and as the results in this paper will
show, an adversary mounting a RoQ attack does not have to
overwhelm the network resource under attack in order for its
attack to be effective. Moreover, the transients induced by
the attack are not much different from those that are possi-
ble under normal operation (except that they do not subside).
These dimensions of RoQ attacks make it challenging for a
network resource to even realize that it is under attack.
Even if the network element is known to be under at-
tack [28], tracing back the perpetrators and/or taking counter
measures3 is much more challenging than in traditional DoS
attacks. Specifically, packets generated by an adversary do
not even have to use specific destination addresses since the
target of the attack is not the destination but rather a router
along the path. In effect, this flexibility provides the adver-
sary with two degrees of freedom for “evading” detection.
The first degree of freedom—as in traditional DoS at-
tacks on web servers/sites—is through the use of many
sources to mount the attack (i.e., mounting a Distributed RoQ
attack). For instance, these sources (possibly zombies) could
take turn in sending the attack traffic. The second degree of
freedom—and unlike traditional DoS—is through the use of
many destinations in the attack traffic. Indeed, every packet
sent from a source of the attack could be sent to a different
destination. Moreover, as long as they are known to be routed
through the resource under attack, these destinations do not
even have to be legitimate or live addresses.4
3. Network Model and RoQ Exploits
In this section, we illustrate how the transients of adaptation
could be exploited in a RoQ attack. We do so by analytically
deriving the effect of a RoQ attack on a set of rate-controlled
connections, each with transmission rate xr. The value of xr
for a given connection is adapted based on congestion feed-
back (equivalently, prices) from links along the route r of that
connection. We use the following differential equations [21]:
d
dt
xr(t) = κ
(
wr − xr(t)
∑
l∈r
pl(
∑
l∈s
xs(t))
)
(2)
where κ represents the gain of the system; the first term rep-
resents the additive rate increase and the second term repre-
sents the multiplicative decrease (as in the AIMD transmis-
sion rules of TCP).
The link function pl(.) reflects the prices (or, costs)
fed back to the sources as the input load on the link varies.
Figure 1 shows an example of a pricing function. Given
3For example using network ingress filtering [11], traceback [31], or new
router functionalities, such as those envisioned in [8].
4Notice that this destination flexibility makes the need for “spoofing”
source addresses to evade detection less important.
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Figure 1: An example of a link pricing function
such positive, continuous, and increasing function, one could
show that the Lyapunov function [29] of the system is given
by [21]:
U(x) =
∑
r∈R
wrlog xr −
∑
l∈L
∫ ∑
l∈s xs
y=0
pl(y)dy (3)
where U(x) represents the net gain—the first term represents
the gain in sending rates, while the second term represents
the associated costs. A Lyapunov stability analysis shows
that the system converges to a stable state x∗r that maximizes
U(x), i.e. ddtU(x(t)) > 0 if xr(t) = x∗r and equals zero when
xr(t) = x∗r for all r.
The steady-state rates x∗r can be obtained by equating to
zero the following partial derivatives:
∂
∂ t
U(x) =
wr
xr
−
∑
l∈r
pl(
∑
l∈s
xs) (4)
Given that this system is guaranteed to converge from any
starting state xr(0), one would be interested in that rate of
convergence. If the system is perturbed around its steady-
state, a linearized model—in terms of new variables yr(t),
such that xr(t) = x∗r +
√
(x∗r)yr(t)—yields [21]:
d
dt
y(t) = −κ
(
WX−1 +X1/2ATP ′AX1/2
)
y(t)
= −κΓTΦΓ y(t) (5)
In the above, W , X , and P ′ are diagonal matrices, where
the diagonal elements are wr, x∗r , and the derivatives of
pl(
∑
l∈s x
∗
s), respectively. The matrix A is an L×R matrix,
where entry al,r=1 if connection r is using link l. The diag-
onal matrix Φ gives the eigen values of the system along the
diagonal. The smallest eigen value, call it λ, determines the
rate of convergence of the system—a higher value indicates
faster convergence, as the transient response of the system
decays more rapidly.
The above analysis could be used to provide insights
into the effect of RoQ attacks on such a system.
Assume that the system had already stabilized to its
steady-state x∗r values. Since a link is used to its almost max-
imum capacity, the additional attack load is likely to push
Time
x
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x
r
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Figure 2: RoQ attack on the stability of the system
the link towards saturation where the fed-back prices are ex-
tremely high (cf. Figure 1). Since the RoQ attack involves
a sustained rate of δ for τ units of time, the system will be
pushed to a new stable point, say (x′)∗r . Let λ′ refer to the
new smallest eigen value, representing the convergence rate
to the new stable point (i.e., from x∗r to (x′)∗r). Since during
the attack duration τ , the capacity of the attacked link is ef-
fectively reduced, the link pricing function is pushed to the
left, as shown in Figure 1. Such higher prices result in faster
convergence (i.e., higher λ′) and lower (x′)∗r .5
As soon as the system stabilizes to the new (x′)∗r , an op-
timized RoQ attack would cease its attack so as to allow the
system to return to its original state x∗r . This attack pattern
then repeats. Figure 2 illustrates the effect of such RoQ at-
tack, when the system spends its time oscillating between dif-
ferent states, in the presence and absence of the attack traffic.
Note that in general, the attack traffic may destroy the “con-
tractive” mapping property of the pricing function and so the
system may not converge to a fixed point while under attack.
To assess the impact of the RoQ attack, we turn our at-
tention to the attack potency as defined in Equation 1. In
terms of the above analytical model parameters, one may cap-
ture the “damage” caused by the attack using the expression
δ( 1λ′ +
1
λ ). Intuitively, this expression represents the wasted
bandwidth (and other service qualities such as delay and rate
jitter, as we discuss later) during instability. Also, one may
capture the “cost” of the attack by (δ/( 1λ′ +
1
λ )). Intuitively,
the cost increases with increasing peak rate and decreases
with longer attack period. Figure 3 shows a single measure
of attack potency versus attack peak rate, where potency in
this model is defined by:
Potency = Π =
δ( 1λ′ +
1
λ )(
δ/( 1λ′ +
1
λ )
)1/Ω
Π = δ1−
1
Ω (
1
λ′
+
1
λ
)1+
1
Ω (6)
As we eluded before, Ω reflects the relative values that an
attacker attributes to “damage” versus “cost”, or equivalently
the desired level of aggression.
Figure 3 shows the potency plots for a 2-link tandem
network used by three rate-controlled sources. The pricing
5Since during the attack, the pricing function includes δ, the convergence
rate λ′ depends on δ.
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function of the first link is p1(y) = 0.2/(10 − y), and that
of the second link is p2(y) = 0.5/(5 − y). One connection
crosses both links, while each of the other two crosses only
one link. The additive-increase parameters wr are taken to
be (0.5, 1.5, 1.0)—the increase rate is lowest for the longest
2-link connection.
We observe that for a given value of Ω, there is an opti-
mal attack peak rate δ that optimizes potency Π. On the one
hand, a low attack peak rate, while less costly, results in min-
imal damage, and thus results in low potency. On the other
hand, a higher attack peak rate, while resulting in higher dam-
age, may be too costly that it results in lower potency. This
suggests that an optimized RoQ attacker can achieve higher
potency (i.e. higher damage per unit-cost) by forcing the sys-
tem into instabilities at the right times, injecting only the right
amount of attack traffic. This is true for any level of attacker’s
aggressiveness, Ω.
Note that in this model, a RoQ attacker attempts to cause
damage by specifically exploiting the AIMD-like dynamics
of the system. Such dynamics are essential in driving the
system to fairness. If one were to protect the system against
RoQ attacks through other increase-decrease rules as AIAD
or MIMD (to avoid drastic reductions at the time of the at-
tack or to ramp the rate back up more quickly when the at-
tack ceases), then fairness can’t be achieved. Such tradeoff
between protection against attacks and performance during
normal operating conditions is very important to highlight. In
the remainder of this paper, we confirm these analytical ob-
servations using more elaborate models, and also using sim-
ulations and Internet experiments. These more detailed mod-
els will include other dynamics, such as those resulting from
TCP timeouts. Nevertheless, the simple model presented here
unifies important general dynamics of many adaptive com-
puting and networking systems. For example, the xr vari-
ables may represent the sending rates of TCP sources, or the
admission rates of different classes of web requests. Ad-
ditionally, the pricing function pl(.) may represent the con-
gestion feedback signals (e.g. from RED-like AQM) to TCP
sources, or the degradation in the service rate of a web server
as it thrashes under high load.
4. Vulnerability Assessment
Wasted Bandwidth as the Target of RoQ Attacks: Con-
sider an attacker bent on maximizing the bandwidth wasted
as a result of a RoQ attack.6 Thus, we define bw, the
wasted bandwidth, to be the difference between the achiev-
able throughput under normal conditions and the achievable
throughput under a RoQ attack, both measured as the num-
ber of packets (or bytes) going through the link for legitimate
traffic. Thus, bw quantifies the absolute “damage” resulting
from the attack. Let ba, the attack bandwidth, denote the
6Later, we consider other attack objectives—e.g., maximize jitter.
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Figure 3: Attack potency versus attack peak rate for Ω=1 (la-
bels on left y-axis) and for Ω=2 (labels on right y-axis).
bandwidth consumed by the attacker over the link under at-
tack. Clearly ba could be construed as the cost of the attack—
for instance because the higher the value of ba the more likely
that the attacker would be identified. Substituting in Equation
1, we get the following definition of attack potency:
Π =
bw
b
1
Ω
a
(7)
The above definition doesn’t account for the total traffic sent
by the attacker but only for the attack traffic that is observable
at the link under attack. We have also used an alternative
measure of cost that accounts for the total traffic injected by
the adversary; the resulting potencies were indistinguishable.
Detailed Analysis: We extend an analytical fluid model sim-
ilar to that proposed in [16, 20, 24, 32] to assess the potential
damage that could be inflicted by an attacker exploiting the
dynamics of adaptation for TCP + AQM (namely, AIMD +
RED).
We consider a dynamic fluid model of m TCP con-
nections and a single CBR connection, representing the at-
tacker’s traffic, traversing a single bottleneck of capacity C.
The round trip time ri(t) at time t for connection i is equal to
the round-trip propagation delay Di between the sender and
the receiver for connection i, plus the queuing delay at the
bottleneck router. Thus ri(t) can be expressed by
ri(t) = Di +
b(t)
C
(8)
where b(t) is the backlog buffer size at time t at the bottleneck
router. We denote the propagation delay from sender i to
the bottleneck by Dsib, which is a fraction αi of the total
propagation delay.
Dsib = αiDi (9)
The backlog buffer b(t) evolves according to the equation
b˙(t) =
m∑
i=1
xi(t−Dsib) + y(t−Dab)− C (10)
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which is equal to the input rate xi(.) from the m connections
plus the attacker’s traffic y(.), minus the output link rate. No-
tice that the input rates are delayed by the propagation delay
from the senders and the attacker to the bottleneck Dsib and
Dab.
The losses seen by the connections depend on our choice
of queue management at the bottleneck router. For RED [14],
the congestion loss probability pc(t) is given by:
pc(t) =


0 v(t) ≤ Bmin
σ(v(t)− ς) Bmin < v(t) < Bmax
1 v(t) ≥ Bmax
(11)
where σ and ς are the RED parameters given by
Pmax/(Bmax − Bmin) and Bmin, respectively, and v(t) is
the average queue size, which evolves according to the equa-
tion:
v˙(t) = −βC(v(t)− b(t)), 0 < β < 1 (12)
Notice that in the above relationship, we multiply β by C
since RED updates the average queue length at every packet
arrival, whereas our model is a fluid model [16, 24].
The throughput of TCP, xi(t) is given by
xi(t) =
wi(t)
ri(t)
(13)
where wi(t) is the size of the TCP congestion window for
sender i.
According to TCP’s AIMD rules, the dynamics of TCP
throughput for each of the m connections can be described
by the following differential equations:
x˙i(t) =
xi(t− ri(t))
r2i (t)xi(t)
(1− pc(t−Dbsi(t)))−
xi(t)xi(t− ri(t))
2
(pc(t−Dbsi(t)))
i = 1, 2, ..,m (14)
The first term represents the additive increase rule, whereas
the second represents the multiplicative decrease rule. Both
sides are multiplied by the rate of acknowledgments for the
last window of packets xi(t − ri(t)). In the above equa-
tions, the time delay from the bottleneck to sender i, passing
through the receiver i, is given by:
Dbsi(t) = ri(t)−Dsib (15)
The attack traffic, y(t), follows a square wave is given by:
y(t) =
{
δ t mod T ≤ τ
0 otherwise (16)
where δ is the attack amplitude, τ is the attack duration and
T is the attack period. All defined above.
The fluid model presented above is only capable of cap-
turing the dynamics due to AIMD. Thus the effects of slow
start and timeouts are ignored. Despite these limitations, the
model is useful as it provides a “lower-bound” assessment of
vulnerability to RoQ attacks. By lower bound, we mean that
in reality, as we will show in simulation and Internet experi-
ments, the impact of a RoQ attack is likely to be even worse
than the model predicts. This is so because it is reasonable to
assume that the attack duration will be long enough for many
connections not only to back off, but also to go into time-
out/slow start, which would increase the “damage” from the
attack.
Quantitative Assessment of Attack Potency: We are now
ready to put the fluid model just developed to work by numer-
ically solving for the attack potency. In the next two sections,
we present results of ns simulations and Internet experiments
that relax the simplistic assumptions of our model to capture
various effects (e.g., slowstart, timeouts, cross traffic on mul-
tiple hops) and other queue management policy (e.g., Drop-
Tail).
Based on the fluid model developed above, we quantify
the impact of RoQ attacks by considering an example param-
eterization of the model. Specifically, we consider a bottle-
neck RED link of 2,000 packets/sec (=16Mbps) capacity tra-
versed by 19 TCP connections and a single CBR connection
representing the attacker’s traffic—a total of 20 connections.
The bottleneck’s buffer size is 250 packets. The RED param-
eters, minimum and maximum thresholds, were tuned to 50
and 120, respectively. The weight parameter was chosen to
be 0.00001, and the maximum loss probability was chosen
to be 0.1. The propagation delays of the connections were
generated uniformly between 80 and 120 msec. We start the
attack at time t = 40 with a δ = 16Mbps, τ = 0.2 seconds,
and T = 5 seconds. The value T was chosen to roughly
match the time it takes the queue to converge to its steady
state operating point. As we will discuss later, an attacker
could “discover” this value using a number of methods.
Figure 4(a) shows the queue size predicted by our ana-
lytical model for 0 ≤ t ≤ 100. Clearly, after a short while,
RED’s queue size stabilizes, indicating that the system con-
verges to an efficient operating point. However, as soon as the
attack is started, one can see the wide oscillations in queue
size, which includes periods of time during which RED’s
queue is empty, implying an inefficient operation (i.e., a loss
of capacity, which is precisely the goal of the attack). Figure
4(b) takes a closer look at the period of time 35 ≤ t ≤ 50. It
shows how the oscillations resulting from two attack cycles
at time t = 40 and t = 45 cause the queue size to reach zero,
leading to under utilization.
Figure 4(c) shows the average throughput for each flow
traversing the link from t = 40 to t = 60 (i.e., while the
link is under attack). The flow with ID=20 represents the
attacker’s flow. Clearly, the average throughput consumed
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by the attacker is indistinguishable from that consumed by
the remaining 19 legitimate flows. Thus, by simply looking
for flows that use more than their fair share over the time
scale of the attack period (or even shorter if the attacker sends
its packets with different destinations, as we pointed out in
Section 2), it would be impossible to identify the attacker—
not to mention realizing that the system is under attack in the
first place! Indeed, as we mentioned earlier in the paper, one
of the dangerous aspects of exploits that capitalize on system
dynamics is that they are harder to detect.
5. Simulation Experiments
As we mentioned before, the analytical model used in the
quantitative evaluation in Section 4 does not capture many
aspects of the system dynamics (e.g., variability in RTT, ef-
fects of timeouts, etc.) To validate that (simple) model, we
present results from ns simulations [10] in which such limi-
tations are not present.
Similar to the setting we chose for our numerical evalu-
ation, we consider a bottleneck link with 2,000 packets/sec
(=16Mbps) capacity, 250-packet buffer size, and a 20ms
propagation delay shared by a number of TCP connections
with unlimited data to send, and a CBR connection repre-
senting the attack traffic. The propagation delay for the ac-
cess links are chosen uniformly at random between 15 and 25
msec. So the average round trip propagation delay is around
120 msec. We run the experiments with 10, 20, 30 and 120
connections, including the attack traffic.
Results of RoQ Attack on a RED Queue: Figures 5(a),
5(b), and 5(c) show the results obtained from ns simulations
when the queue management is RED. The RED parameters,
minimum and maximum thresholds, were tuned to 50 and
120, respectively. The weight parameter was chosen to be
0.0001, and the maximum loss probability was chosen to be
0.1. Figures 5(a), 5(b), and 5(c) show the queue size (and av-
erage queue size as estimated by RED) for 0 ≤ t ≤ 100,
a closeup of the period 35 ≤ t ≤ 50 showing the stabi-
lized queue followed by two attack cycles at t = 40 and
t = 45, and the average throughput achieved for the 19 legit-
imate flows and for the 20th attack flow. Clearly, the results
of our ns simulations shown in Figures 5(a), 5(b), and 5(c)
match fairly well those obtained using the analytical model
of Section 4 in Figures 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c).
Results of RoQ Attack on a DropTail Queue: Figure 6(a),
6(b), and 6(c) show the results obtained from ns simulations
when the queue management is DropTail. The difference be-
tween these results and those obtained for RED is that the
queue size (prior to the attack) does not stabilize around a
target value. This is expected given that DropTail does not
aim to stabilize the queue. Also, the average throughput for
the different flows is less uniform under DropTail than un-
der RED. Again, this is expected by virtue of RED’s design
principles. Surprisingly, though, our results suggest that both
RED and DropTail are equally susceptible to the attack. In
other words, RED’s attempt to more fairly drop/mark pack-
ets across all flows based on buffer occupancy, while helping
it with fairness, does not protect it from being exploited by
a RoQ attack. Since DropTail recovers faster than any AQM
(since it doesn’t generate early congestion signals after the
attack is over), a RoQ attack basically degenerates any AQM
to DropTail making them all susceptible to being exploited.
RoQ Attack Potency: Table 1 shows the achievable potency
of the RoQ attack predicted by our numerical model of Sec-
tion 4 and validated by the simulation experiments presented
above. For DropTail, the table shows that a well orchestrated
RoQ attack with a rate of 44 packets/sec, representing less
than 2.5% of the link’s capacity, is capable of robbing that
link of over 25% of that capacity—a potency of over 10.
Damage Cost Potency
bw ba Π
RED (model) 177 79 2.15
RED (ns) 467 56 8.30
DropTail (ns) 475 44 10.7
Table 1: Potency values for Bandwidth (with Ω = 1)
Jitter as a Goal of RoQ Attacks: In our discussions so far,
we have focused on bandwidth as the subject of the RoQ at-
tack. This need not be the case.7 As both of our numerical
and simulation results shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6 clearly
show, RoQ attacks result in other undesirable effects, includ-
ing a larger delay jitter as evident from the larger oscillations
in queue size induced by the attack for both RED and Drop-
Tail. Such reduction in service quality could well be the tar-
get of a RoQ attack. Table 2 shows the achievable potency of
the RoQ attack we have considered above, if increasing jitter
is the goal of the attack.
One interesting observation from the results shown in
Table 2 is that the impact on jitter of RoQ attacks on a RED
queue is much more pronounced than that on a DropTail
queue. This is expected since RED actively aims to reduce
jitter (by stabilizing the queue size) whereas DropTail does
not. Thus, a RoQ attack on a RED queue could be seen as
robbing RED of its advantage over DropTail.
The results in Tables 1 and 2 confirm what we men-
tioned earlier–namely that the analytical model of Section 4
provides us with a “lower bound” on the achievable potency
in practice.8 For example, the model predicted a potency of
2.15 for an attack aiming to bleed link bandwidth when our
ns simulations resulted in a potency of 8.3. In other words, in
addition to the bandwidth it consumes, an attacker can bleed
more than eight times that bandwidth by exploiting system
dynamics. Similarly, the model predicted a potency of 0.36
7Indeed, this may be a difficult goal to achieve in practice.
8Our Internet experiment will further validate this in the next section.
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Figure 4: Assessment of vulnerability to RoQ attacks: Results from analytical model of TCP+RED showing queue size over
time (left and center) and and the throughput achieved per flow in the presence of the attack (right).
0   20 40 60 80 100
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Time
Qu
eu
e 
Si
ze
Instantaneous Queue
Average Queue
(a)
35 40 45 50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Time
Qu
eu
e 
Si
ze
Instantaneous Queue
Average Queue
(b)
0 5 10 15 20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Connection ID
Av
er
ag
e 
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
Legitimate Traffic
Attack Traffic
(c)
Figure 5: Assessment of vulnerability to RoQ attacks: Results from ns simulations over a RED showing queue size over time
(left and center) and the throughput achieved per flow in the presence of the attack (right).
Delay Jitter Damage Cost Potency
Before After (msec) ba Π
RED (model) 0.0 28.5 28.5 79 0.36
RED (ns) 8.50 37.5 29.0 56 0.52
DropTail (ns) 32.0 42.0 10.0 44 0.23
Table 2: Potency values for Delay Jitter (with Ω = 1)
for an attack aiming to increase delay jitter when our ns sim-
ulations resulted in a potency that is 44% higher at 0.52. The
meaning of this potency is that by exploiting network dy-
namics, a RoQ attacker is able to inflict 0.52 milliseconds
of added jitter for every extra packet it injects in the network
per second.9
Tuning the RoQ Attack Parameters: The parameters of the
RoQ attack used to produce the results shown in Tables 1 and
2 were chosen rather arbitrarily. Specifically, δ, τ , and T
were “educated guesses” given the a priori known settings of
the experiment—namely, RTT, link capacity, etc. Are these
attack parameters optimal though? Could a different set of
parameters lead to higher potency?
For a chosen burst of size M = δ× τ , the attacker has a
9Notice that this 0.52 msec is the best an attacker can do since this value
represents the transmission time of a packet.
choice of using a large amplitude δ over a short duration τ , or
else using a smaller amplitude over a longer duration. Figure
7(a) shows the potency of a RoQ attack with M = 5 for var-
ious δ (or equivalently for various τ = M/δ) values and for
different number of flows. The figure shows that there is an
“optimal” choice of δ that maximizes the attack potency. Fig-
ure 7(b) shows that this “optimal” setting changes as a func-
tion of M , for a given number of flows (namely 20). Thus,
for any value of M and for any number of flows traversing
the link under attack, an adversary could pick the value that
will maximize the potency of its attack.
Next, we consider T , the attack period. Intuitively, one
would think that the smaller the value of T , the more the dam-
age inflicted on the link. But, as Figure 7(c) shows, the attack
potency decreases fairly rapidly once the period T decreases
below some threshold (i.e., moving towards 0 on the x-axis).
For example, with 10 flows traversing the link under attack,
the potency of an attack of magnitude M = 5 quickly dimin-
ishes when T is less than 5 seconds. In other words, there is
a point of diminishing returns (to the attacker) beyond which
increasing the rate of the attack does not payoff in terms of
the harm done per packet of attack traffic. Thus, an adversary
bent on causing the maximum harm with the minimum attack
traffic would chose the minimum value of T that is larger than
8
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Figure 6: Assessment of vulnerability to RoQ attacks: Results from ns simulations over a DropTail queue showing queue size
over time (left and center) and the throughput achieved per flow in the presence of the attack (right).
that point of diminishing returns.
As discussed above, for each value of M there are “op-
timal” values of δ (τ ) and T . Assuming that these optimal
values are selected, Figure 7(d) shows the attack potency as
a function of M . The figure suggests that for a given number
of flows traversing the link under attack, there is a point of
diminishing returns beyond which increasing the magnitude
of the attack does not buy the attacker more potency.
Notice that the above tuning of the RoQ attack param-
eters depends very much on the aggressiveness Ω of the at-
tacker (assumed to be 1 above). Figures 7(e)-(h) show how
potencies change when the attack parameters are changed,
when Ω = 2. Clearly, the optimal parameters of a RoQ attack
with Ω = 2 are different from those obtained with Ω = 1.
The above tuning of the attack parameters was per-
formed with an eye on maximizing the wasted bandwidth per
attack “byte”. Would this set of parameters be also optimal
for a RoQ attack aiming to maximize delay jitter? Figures
8(a-h) show the parameter space of a RoQ attack aiming to
maximize delay jitter. Clearly, the set of parameters that op-
timize such an attack are different from those optimizing an
attack on link bandwidth.
Measurement-Based On-Line Tuning of RoQ Attacks: In
the above tuning of RoQ attacks (to optimize potency), it was
assumed that system parameters such as link capacity, num-
ber of flows, and RTTs are known a priori. This is a meaning-
ful assumption if the adversary is an oracle (or an author :),
but not otherwise. Even if optimal attack parameters are pos-
sible to derive, these parameters are likely to depend on the
profile of the traffic going through the router (e.g., the mix of
RTTs). This suggests that any set of fixed parameters may
not be optimal at all times. One alternative to fixing the val-
ues of δ, τ , and T is to use a measurement based approach to
orchestrating the attack. Specifically, it is reasonable to as-
sume that an adversary would have at its disposal the arsenal
of measurement tools available publicly—tools that could be
used to estimate the bandwidth or the buffer size of the tar-
geted link, for example. Alternatively, an attacker could use a
TCP connection as a “probe” via which to measure the dam-
age caused by its attack. Using that as the feedback signal
to a simple controller, the attacker could easily adjust the pa-
rameters of the RoQ Attack to maximize potency.
6. Internet Experiments
Experimental Setup: Figure 9 depicts the experimental
setup we used for our Internet experiments. It consists of a
router (R), a local content server (S0), three client machines
(C1, C2, and C3), a source of attack traffic (As) and a sink of
attack traffic (Ak). The router’s server-side interface is con-
nected to a 100 Mbps switch that connects the whole setup to
the Internet, the content server machine (S0) and the attack
source (As). The router’s client-side interface is connected
to another 100 Mbps switch that connects it to the local sub-
net where client machines (C1, C2, and C3) and attack sink
(Ak) reside. The network interface cards on all machines run
at 100 Mbps except for the router’s client-side interface, rep-
resenting the bottleneck link, which runs at 10 Mbps. All
machines run Linux RedHat version 2.4.20. The router uses
iproute2 and tc [19] to run different packet scheduling disci-
plines. In all experiments we report on in this paper, we used
a packetized version of FIFO (called pfifo).
A client (Ci) is configured to request local data trans-
fers from the local server S0 or via HTTP 1.1 from a remote
transatlantic Internet server (S1). As described in Section 2,
the attack source (As) injects UDP packets destined to sink
(Ak)10 following the RoQ attack square wave pattern with
parameters δ, τ and T . Since the traffic injected by As passes
through the bottleneck link, the attacker’s main goal is to ad-
just its parameters to maximize potency.
In calculating results from a given experiment we al-
ways discard the data from the first 10 seconds to allow for
10Unlike traditional DoS attacks, Ak is not the target of the attack, but
rather a co-conspirator of As, or even a bystander which does not even have
to be on-line (as long as packets destined to it are routed through the target
of the attack—namely router R).
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Figure 7: Tuning attack parameters to maximize potency (for link bandwidth) using Ω = 1 (top) and Ω = 2 (bottom): Effect of
changing δ for a fixed magnitude (M = 5) under different number of flows (a & e). Effect of changing δ for a fixed number of
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optimal δ under different number of flows (c & g). Effect of changing M with corresponding optimal δ and T (d & h).
Client C1
Client C2
Client C3
100Mbps
Switch
10 Mbps
Attack Sink A
100Mbps
Switch
Attack Source A
Server S0
Internet
Router R
Server S1
k s
Figure 9: Setup for Internet Experiments.
throughput to ramp up. Unless otherwise specified, each ex-
periment lasted for two minutes. As one would expect, ex-
periments that only involved machines in our laboratories
produced almost identical results every time they were run.
When our experiments involved remote servers (e.g., S1), re-
sults were not consistent when experiments were conducted
over different times (e.g., mornings versus evenings). How-
ever, when experiments involving remote servers were con-
ducted at the same time-window (on different days), the re-
sults were fairly consistent. All such experiments we report
on in this section were performed in a three-hour window of
time from 4:00am to 7:00am GMT.
RoQ Attacks on Flows with Short RTTs: In this set of ex-
periments, each client Ci opens two TCP connections to the
server S0 for a total of 6 TCP flows traversing the bottleneck
link. Under no RoQ attack traffic, the 6 flows achieve a total
throughput of 8.45 Mbps, with the average round-trip time
between the clients and the server measured to be 15msec.
To ensure queuing and induce drops at the bottleneck link R,
the attack rate δ was fixed at 9.5 Mbps, and the attack du-
ration τ and period T were varied to assess the potency of
various RoQ attacks as was done numerically in Section 4
and in simulation in Section 5.
With the attack duration τ fixed at 40 msec, Figure 10(a)
shows the effect of varying the attack period T . With the at-
tack idle time (i.e., T − τ ) fixed at 250 msec, Figure 11(a)
shows the effect of changing the attack duration τ . As these
figures suggest, the maximum potency was achieved when
the attack period was set to 270msec and when the attack
duration was set to 20msec. With these settings, the total
throughput achieved by the 6 flows dropped from 8.45 Mbps
to 4.47 Mbps with only 0.45Mbps of attacker’s traffic—a po-
tency of almost 9 (using Ω = 1).
RoQ Attacks on Flows with Long RTTs: In this experi-
ment, each client issues two HTTP requests for a very large
file to the remote server S1. Thus, in total, 6 TCP connec-
tions traverseR. With no RoQ attacks present, the total band-
width grabbed by the 6 flows is 8.08Mbps,11 with the average
round-trip time between the clients and the server measured
to be 120msec. A characterization of the Internet path from
R to S1 revealed a 21-hop route with a bottleneck bandwidth
well over the 10Mbps capacity of R.
With the attack duration τ fixed at 40 msec, Figure 10(b)
11Notice that this value is slightly lower than the 8.45Mbps total through-
put obtained with local connections. This could be explained by virtue of the
longer RTT of transatlantic connections.
10
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 800
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Attack Amplitude
Po
te
nc
y
10 connections
20 connections
30 connections
120 connections
(a)
100 200 300 400 100 200 300 4000.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Attack Amplitude
Po
te
nc
y
Magnitude 5
Magnitude 10
Magnitude 15
Magnitude 20
(b)
0 5 10 15 20 25 300
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Period (sec)
Po
te
nc
y
10 connections
20 connections
30 connections
120 connections
(c)
5 15 25 35 450
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Strength
M
ax
im
um
 P
ot
en
cy
(d)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 800
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Attack Amplitude
Po
te
nc
y
10 connections
20 connections
30 connections
120 connections
(e)
100 200 300 400 100 200 300 4000
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Attack Amplitude
Po
te
nc
y
Magnitude 5
Magnitude 10
Magnitude 15
Magnitude 20
(f)
0 5 10 15 20 25 300
2
4
6
8
10
12
Period (sec)
Po
te
nc
y
10 connections
20 connections
30 connections
120 connections
(g)
5 15 25 35 450
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strength
M
ax
im
um
 P
ot
en
cy
(h)
Figure 8: Tuning attack parameters to maximize potency (for delay jitter) using Ω = 1 (top) and Ω = 2 (bottom): Effect of
changing δ for a fixed magnitude (M = 5) under different number of flows (a & e). Effect of changing δ for a fixed number of
20 flows under different attack magnitudes (b & f). Effect of changing T for a fixed magnitude (M = 5) with corresponding
optimal δ under different number of flows (c & g). Effect of changing M with corresponding optimal δ and T (d & h).
shows the effect of varying the attack period T . With the at-
tack idle time (i.e., T − τ ) fixed to 1,000 msec, Figure 11(b)
shows the effect of changing the attack duration τ . The
trends in these figures are consistent with those observed in
simulations—for example the trends in Figure 10(b) match
those in Figure 7(c & g). As these figures suggest, the max-
imum potency was achieved when T was set to 1,040 msec
and when the attack duration was set to 40msec. With these
settings, the total throughput achieved by the 6 flows dropped
from 8.08 Mbps to 3.6 Mbps with only 0.37 Mbps of at-
tacker’s traffic—a potency of almost 12 (using Ω = 1).
It is worth noting that setting the attack duration τ to
240msec, which is close to twice the round-trip time, and
setting the attack period T to around 1 sec reduces the RoQ
attack to the shrew attack [22], which would cause TCP to
perpetually timeout. This setting is indeed one of the points
shown in Figure 11(b). Interestingly enough, relying on TCP
timeout mechanism to cause the maximum damage per unit
of attack traffic is not effective. Indeed, if we examine the
results of the experiment with settings resulting in a shrew
attack, we observe that the total throughput of the 6 flows
was brought down from 8.08 Mbps to 1.25 Mbps with an
average attack traffic of 1.58 Mbps—a potency of only 4.3.
Notice that with a period T of around 1 second, an attack
with a much lower rate of 0.3 Mbps would achieve a potency
of over 12.25 (close to three times that achieved by the shrew
attack), bringing down the throughput achieved by the six
flows to 4.4 Mbps.
Another point worth mentioning is that a “flooding” ap-
proach to hijacking a link’s capacity (a la DoS attacks) is also
quite inefficient if maximizing the damage caused per byte of
attack traffic is the goal. While flooding would indeed shut
down the TCP connections, its potency will also approach
0 as the attacker must inject a lot of traffic (not to mention
increasing its exposure).
These results demonstrate that to maximize the marginal
utility of attack traffic, exploiting the transients of adaptation
is the way to go; it is a much more efficient strategy than
exploiting specific protocol properties (such as timeouts) or
simply blasting packets at the highest rate.
RoQ Attack on a Mix of Long and Short RTT Flows: In
this experiment, each client opens two connections: one on
the remote server S1 and one on the local server S0. Thus,
in total, 6 TCP connections traverse R—three with RTT of
around 15 msec and three of around 120 msec. With no
RoQ attacks present, the total bandwidth for the 6 flows is
8.45Mbps. With the attack duration τ fixed to 20 msec, Fig-
ure 10(c) shows the effect of varying the attack period T .
With the attack idle time (i.e., T − τ ) fixed to 250 msec, Fig-
ure 11(c) shows the effect of changing the attack duration τ .
As these figures suggest, the maximum potency is
achieved when the attack period was set to 270msec and
when the attack duration was set to 20msec. With these set-
tings, the total throughput achieved by the 6 flows dropped
from 8.45 Mbps to 3.7 Mbps with only 0.45 Mbps of at-
tacker’s traffic—a potency of over 10.5. These results are
quite similar to those obtained with six short RTT flows—
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Figure 10: Potency of Internet RoQ attack as the attack period T (in seconds) is changed while keeping the attack duration
τ constant. Two potency curves are shown one for Ω = 1 (labels on left y-axis) and one for Ω = 2 (labels on right y-axis).
Results shown are for (a) RoQ attack on flows with short RTTs with τ=40msec, (b) flows with long RTTs with τ 40msec, (c) a
mix of long and short RTT flows with τ = 20msec.
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Figure 11: Potency of Internet RoQ attack as the attack duration τ (in milliseconds) is changed while keeping the attack duration
τ constant. Two potency curves are shown one for Ω = 1 (labels on left y-axis) and one for Ω = 2 (labels on right y-axis).
Results shown are for (a) RoQ attack on flows with short RTTs with T − τ=250msec, (b) flows with long RTTs with T − τ
1,000msec, (c) a mix of long and short RTT flows with T − τ = 250msec.
suggesting that a RoQ attack on the lower-end of the RTT
profile of flows going through the bottleneck is effective.
7. RoQ Attacks on End Systems
So far we have focused on the vulnerability of network adap-
tation to RoQ attacks. Clearly, adaptation mechanisms per-
vade the design of many other types of systems and services,
including network servers and end systems, such as web
servers, DNS servers, and BGP servers. The insights gained
from our work, as well as the framework we adopted in our
analysis (e.g., models, techniques, and metrics) are quite ap-
plicable in evaluating similar RoQ vulnerabilities. Indeed, as
part of this project, we have also examined the vulnerabil-
ity of a variety of admission control strategies that are often
deployed in end hosts for overload protection [35], reaching
very similar conclusions to the ones presented in this paper.
Space limitations prohibit us from presenting these results
with at any meaningful depth. Nevertheless, in this section
we present an illustrative example and “sample” numeric re-
sults obtained using a control theoretic model—similar in na-
ture to those presented earlier in this paper—to evaluate RoQ
attacks on an admission controller, which is widely deployed
in front-ends of Internet web servers and web server farms.
The feedback delay inherent in the design of any admis-
sion controller constitutes the “Trojan Horse” through which
a RoQ attack could be mounted. Consider an admission con-
troller that sets its admission rate of incoming requests as a
function of the utilization of its backend. Now, consider a
point in time when offered load is low enough for the ad-
mission controller to allow a large percentage of all requests
to go through. At this point, a surge in demand (e.g., a large
number of requests) in a very short period of time would push
the system into overload conditions. This, in turn, would re-
sult in the admission controller shutting off subsequent le-
gitimate requests for a long time given the fact that under
overloaded conditions, the system operates in an inefficient
region (e.g., due to thrashing). Once the system “recovers”
from the ill-effects of this unsuspected surge in demand, an
attacker would simply repeat the process, resulting in a RoQ
attack pattern akin to that we defined in Section 2.
Figure 12 shows results from such an attack, which were
obtained numerically from a control theoretic model (not
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Figure 12: RoQ attack on a proportional admission controller
and its impact on admission rate and on utilization.
shown) of the admission controller and of the relationship
between service rate and utilization of the backend server.
Figure 12 shows the admission rate as well as the utilization
of the backend system over time. Clearly, within 5 seconds of
operation, the system converges to an efficient operating re-
gion with admission rate at 0.85 and utilization around 0.75.
The RoQ attack is mounted at time 20 for a duration of τ=1
second and is repeated every T=10 seconds, producing a po-
tency of over 100, i.e., one request from the attacker results
in over 100 legitimate requests being denied service.
8. Related Work
To our knowledge, this work is the first to investigate the ad-
versarial exploitation of network dynamics for the purpose
of reducing one or more aspects of service quality or of ef-
ficiency. Clearly, there is a huge literature on many other
forms of adversarial attacks, which range from attacks that
compromise security (e.g., Trojan horse attacks) to those that
target system availability (e.g., DoS attacks). In this section,
we put our work in context by comparing it to existing work,
which while not explicitly looking at exploiting the transients
of adaptation, are nevertheless related.
Modeling of Network Dynamics: There have been a num-
ber of recent works that have focused on the study of network
dynamics using an arsenal of tools and techniques. Most of
these studies have concentrated on the negative impact of in-
terference by non-adversarial processes. Examples include
works in which the negative impact of non-congestion packet
losses (e.g., due to wireless links) is evaluated [2] and new
adaptation strategies to circumvent such impact (e.g., in large
bandwidth-delay product networks) are proposed [4, 12].
While we have employed some of the same analytical tools
and techniques to pursue our study of RoQ attacks, our work
is the first to consider the use of such techniques in assessing
vulnerabilities due to adversarial processes.
Dealing With Misbehaving Flows: There is a large body
of literature that looked at the impact of misbehaving flows
and on detection and policing techniques thereof [25]. Mis-
behaving flows are loosely defined as those who do not adapt
their sending rate in a manner consistent with an established
norm—in particular TCP friendliness [15]. In this body of lit-
erature, the basic assumption is that the goal of misbehaving
flows is to get more than their fair share of bandwidth, typi-
cally by blasting packets at some constant high rate. Indeed,
many of the detection techniques proposed in the literature
are based on that assumption—e.g., by proposing efficient
data structures for the identification of high-bandwidth flows
[9]. While not friendly, misbehaving flows that merely at-
tempt to get more than their fair share of a resource are not
adversarial, in the sense that they are not aiming primarily
at reducing the efficiency or service quality of the resource.
Resources targeted by such flows could well be operating ef-
ficiently, delivering acceptable service quality to other flows
(e.g., low delay and jitter). In this paper, our focus was on
adversarial flows whose sole purpose is precisely to disturb
these aspects of the resource’s operation, while preferably be-
ing “under the radar” as far as their fair use of the resource.
Indeed, the results we show in Section 4 suggest that a flow
consuming only its fair share of bandwidth could be quite
adversarial in its impact.
RoQ versus DoS: DoS attacks [6, 5] and its many variants
[7] could be characterized as targeting one dimension of a
system’s service quality–namely, its availability. There are a
number of papers that classify various forms of DoS attacks;
examples include [18, 27, 26]. Using our model, DoS attacks
could be classified as RoQ attacks with an infinite aggressive-
ness index (defined in Section 3), which imply that the at-
tacker’s ultimate goal is to maximize the damage at any cost.
In this paper, we have focused on attacks whose perpetrators
are not focused on denying access (i.e., targeting availabil-
ity), but rather they are focused on bleeding the system of its
capacity, or simply pushing it to operate in inefficient oper-
ating regions to reduce some aspect of service quality. More
importantly, in this paper, we have focused on the harder-to-
detect, low-intensity attacks, i.e., with modest aggressiveness
compared to the aggressiveness required for DoS attacks.
RoQ versus the “Shrew”: The “Shrew” attack proposed in
[22] is an example of a low-intensity, harder to detect attack
which is targeted at a subset of flows going through a network
link, with the intension of shutting off these flows by synchro-
nizing the attack traffic in such a way to cause these flows to
perpetually timeout. Shrew attacks could be viewed as RoQ
attacks which target service quality extended to a specific set
of flows. As explained in [22] Shrew attacks could result in
shutting off targeted flows without much of an effect on the
link’s utilization. In this paper, we have focused on RoQ at-
tacks that do not target a specific subset of flows, but rather
target the network element itself.
9. Conclusion
This paper highlights the importance of a systematic exam-
ination of the dynamics of systems and networks as possi-
ble vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks. Towards that end,
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we formalized a notion of potency that exposes the trade-
offs between the damage inflicted by an attacker, the cost of
mounting the attack, and the willingness to pay such costs
(i.e., aggressiveness). We identified RoQ attacks as those
attempting to maximize the marginal utility of attack traffic
by optimally exploiting the transients of the underlying sys-
tem adaptation mechanisms. We uncovered susceptibilities
to RoQ attacks that could compromise the efficient opera-
tion and the service quality of Internet resources, by maxi-
mizing wasted bandwidth or delay jitter, for example. Using
the potency metric, the extent of such RoQ exploits can be
quantitatively assessed, enabling a solid basis for comparing
the trustworthiness of competing designs. We used a control-
theoretic model to underline the complex interplay between
the efficiency-load behavior of a resource and the adaptation
mechanisms of both the resource and its consumers. Our con-
clusions are confirmed analytically, numerically, as well as
through simulations and Internet experiments. We believe
this paper to be a first step towards developing a general
understanding of design principles that could be adopted to
protect against RoQ exploits, and applying such principles to
the design and implementation of common adaptive resource
management components.
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